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Abstract
Is the overall value of a world just the sum of values contributed
by each value-bearing entity in that world? Additively separable ax-
iologies (like total utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and critical level
views) say ‘yes’, but non-additive axiologies (like average utilitarian-
ism, rank-discounted utilitarianism, and variable value views) say ‘no’.
This distinction is practically important: additive axiologies support
‘arguments from astronomical scale’ which suggest (among other
things) that it is overwhelmingly important for humanity to avoid
premature extinction and ensure the existence of a large future pop-
ulation, while non-additive axiologies need not. We show, however,
that when there is a large enough ‘background population’ unaffected
by our choices, a wide range of non-additive axiologies converge in
their implications with some additive axiology—for instance, average
utilitarianism converges to critical-level utilitarianism and various
egalitarian theories converge to prioritiarianism. We further argue
that real-world background populations may be large enough to make
these limit results practically significant. This means that arguments
from astronomical scale, and other arguments in practical ethics that
seem to presuppose additive separability, may be truth-preserving
in practice whether or not we accept additive separability as a basic
axiological principle.
1 Introduction
The world we live in is both large and populous. Our planet, for instance, is
4.5 billion years old and has has borne life for roughly 4 billion of those years.
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At any time in its recent history, it has played host to billions of mammals,
trillions of vertebrates, and quintillions of insects and other animals, along
with countless other organisms. Our galaxy contains hundreds of billions
of stars, many or most of which have planets of their own. The observable
universe is billions of light-years across, containing hundreds of billions of
galaxies—and is probably just a small fraction of the universe as a whole.
It may be, therefore, that our biosphere is just one of many (perhaps in-
finitely many). Finally, the future is potentially vast: our descendants could
survive for a very long time, and might someday settle a large part of the
accessible universe, gaining access to a vast pool of resources that would
enable the existence of astronomical numbers of beings with diverse lives
and experiences.
These facts have ethical implications. Most straightforwardly, the poten-
tial future scale of our civilization suggests that it is extremely important to
shape the far future for the better. This view has come to be called longter-
mism, and its recent proponents include Bostrom (2003, 2013), Beckstead
(2013, 2019), Cowen (2018), Greaves and MacAskill (2019), and Ord (2020).
There are many ways in which we might try to positively influence the far
future—e.g., building better and more stable institutions, shaping cultural
norms and moral values, or accelerating economic growth. But one particu-
larly obvious concern is ensuring the long-term survival of our civilization,
by avoiding civilization- or species-ending ‘existential catastrophes’ from
sources like nuclear weapons, climate change, biotechnology, and artificial
intelligence.1 Longtermism in general, and the emphasis on existential
catastrophes in particular, have major revisionary practical implications if
correct, e.g., suggesting the need for major reallocations of resources and
collective attention (Ord, 2020, pp. 57ff).
All these recent defenses of longtermism appeal, in one way or another,
to the astronomical scale of the far future. For instance, Beckstead’s central
argument starts from the premises that ‘Humanity may survive for millions,
billions, or trillions of years’ and ‘If humanity may survive may survive for
millions, billions, or trillions of years, then the expected value of the future
is astronomically great’ (Beckstead, 2013, pp. 1–2). Importantly for our
purposes, the astronomical scale of the far future most plausibly results
from the astronomical number of individuals who might exist in the far
future: while the far future population might consist, say, of just a single
galaxy-spanning individual, the futures that typically strike longtermists as
most worth pursuing involve a very large number of individuals with lives
1The importance of avoiding existential catastrophe is especially emphasized by
Bostrom (2003, 2013) and Ord (2020).
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worth living (and conversely, the futures most worth avoiding involve a very
large number of individuals with lives worth not living).
Under this assumption, we can understand arguments like Beckstead’s
as instantiating the following schema.
Arguments from Astronomical Scale
Because far more welfare subjects or value-bearing entities are affected
by A than by B, we can make a much greater difference to the overall
value of the world by focusing on A rather than B.
Beckstead and other longtermists take this schema and substitute, for in-
stance, ‘the long-run trajectory of human-originating civilization’ for A and
‘the (non-trajectory-shaping) events of the next 100 years’ for B. To illustrate
the scales involved, Bostrom (2013) estimates that if we manage to settle the
stars, our civilization could ultimately support at least 1032 century-long
human lives, or 1052 subjectively similar lives in the form of simulations.
Since only a tiny fraction of those lives would exist in the next century or
millennium, it seems prima facie plausible that even comparatively minus-
cule effects on the far future (e.g., small changes to the average welfare of
the far-future population, or to its size, or to the probability that it comes to
exist in the first place) would be vastly more important than any effects we
can have on the more immediate future.2
Should we find arguments from astronomical scale persuasive? That
is, does the fact that A affects vastly more individuals than B give us strong
reason to believe, in general, that A is vastly more important than B? Al-
though there are many possible complications, the sheer numbers make
these arguments quite strong if we accept an axiology (a theory of the value
of possible worlds or states of affairs) according to which the overall value
of the world is simply a sum of values contributed by each individual in
that world—e.g., the sum of individual welfare levels. In this case, the ef-
fect that some intervention has on the overall value of the world scales
linearly with the number of individuals affected (all else being equal), and
so astronomical scale implies astronomical importance.
But can the overall value of the world be expressed as such a sum? This
question represents a crucial dividing line in axiology, between axiologies
that are additively separable (hereafter usually abbreviated ‘additive’) and
2Thus, for instance, in reference to the 1052 estimate, Bostrom claims that ‘if we give this
allegedly lower bound...a mere 1 per cent chance of being correct, we find that the expected
value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage
point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives’ (Bostrom, 2013, p.
19).
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those that are not. Additive axiologies allow the value of a world to be
represented as a sum of values independently contributed by each value-
bearing entity in that world, while non-additive axiologies do not. For
example, total utilitarianism claims that the value of a world is simply the
sum of the welfare of every welfare subject in that world, and is therefore
additive. On the other hand, average utilitarianism, which identifies the
value of a world with the average welfare of all welfare subjects, is non-
additive.
When we consider non-additive axiologies, the force of arguments from
astronomical scale becomes much less clear, especially in variable-popu-
lation contexts (i.e. when comparing possible populations of different sizes).
They therefore represent a challenge to the case for longtermism and, more
particularly, to the case for the overwhelming importance of avoiding exis-
tential catastrophe. As a stylized illustration: suppose that there are 1010 ex-
isting people, all with welfare 1. We can either (O1) leave things unchanged,
(O2) improve the welfare of all the existing people from 1 to 2, or (O3) create
some number n of new people with welfare 1.5. Total utilitarianism, of
course, tells us to choose O3, as long as n is sufficiently large. But average
utilitarianism—while agreeing that O3 is better than O1 and that the larger
n is, the better—nonetheless prefers O2 to O3 no matter how astronomically
large n may be. Now, additive axiologies can disagree with total utilitar-
ianism here if they claim that adding people with welfare 1.5 makes the
world worse instead of better; but the broader point is that they will almost
always claim that the difference in value between O3 and O1 becomes as-
tronomically large (whether positive or negative) as n increases—bigger,
for example, than the difference in value between O2 and O1. Non-additive
axiologies, on the other hand, need not regard O3 as making a big difference
to the value of the world, regardless of n . Again, average utilitarianism
agrees with total utilitarianism that O3 is an improvement over O1, but re-
gards it as a smaller improvement than O2, even when it affects vastly more
individuals.
Thus, the abstract question of additive separability seems to play a
crucial role with respect to arguably the most important practical question
in population ethics: the relative importance of (i) ensuring the long-term
survival of our civilization and its ability to support a very large number of
future individuals with lives worth living vs. (ii) improving the welfare of the
present population.
The aim of this paper, however, is to show that under certain circum-
stances, a wide range of non-additive axiologies converge in their impli-
cations with some counterpart additive axiology. This convergence has a
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number of interesting consequences, but perhaps the most important is
that non-additive axiologies can inherit the scale-sensitivity of their additive
counterparts. This makes arguments from astronomical scale less reliant on
the controversial assumption of additive separability. It thereby increases
the robustness of the practical case for the overwhelming importance of
the far future and of avoiding existential catastrophe.
Our starting place is the observation that, according to non-additive
axiologies, which of two outcomes is better can depend on the welfare of
the people unaffected by the choice between them. That is, suppose we
are comparing two populations X and Y .3 And suppose that, besides X
and Y , there is some ‘background population’ Z that would exist either
way. (Z might include, for instance, past human or non-human welfare
subjects on Earth, faraway aliens, or present/future welfare subjects who
are simply unaffected by our present choice.) Non-additive axiologies allow
that whether X -and-Z is better than Y -and-Z can depend on facts about
Z .4
With this in mind, our argument has two steps. First, we prove several
results to the effect that, in the large-background-population limit (i.e., as
the size of the background population Z tends to infinity), non-additive
axiologies of various types converge with counterpart additive axiologies.
Thus, these axiologies are effectively additive in the presence of sufficiently
large background populations. Second, we argue that the background pop-
ulations in real-world choice situations are, at a minimum, substantially
larger than the present and near-future human population. This provides
some prima facie reason to believe that non-additive axiologies of the types
we survey will agree closely with their additive counterparts in practice.
More specifically, we argue that real-world background populations are
large enough to substantially increase the importance that average utili-
tarianism (and, more tentatively, variable value views) assign to avoiding
existential catastrophe. Thus, our arguments suggest, it is not merely the
potential scale of the future that has important ethical implications, but also
the scale of the world as a whole—in particular, the scale of the background
3We follow the tradition in population ethics that ‘populations’ are individuated not
only by which people they contain, but also by what their welfare levels would be. (However,
in the formalism introduced in section 2, the populations we’ll consider are anonymous, i.e.
the identities of the people are not specified.)
4The role of background populations in non-separable axiologies has received surpris-
ingly little attention, but has not gone entirely unnoticed. In particular, Budolfson and
Spears (ms) consider the implications of background populations for issues related to the
‘Repugnant Conclusion’ (see §10.1 below). And, as we discovered while revising this paper,
an argument very much in the spirit of our own (though without our formal results) was
elegantly sketched several years ago in a blog post by Carl Shulman (Shulman, 2014).
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population.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces some formal con-
cepts and notation, while section 3 formally defines additive separability
and describes some important classes of additive axiologies. In sections
4–5, we survey several important classes of non-additive axiologies and
show that they become additive in the large-background-population limit.
In section 6, we consider the size and other characteristics of real-world
background populations and, in particular, argue that they are at least sub-
stantially larger than the present human population. In sections 7–8, we
answer two objections: that we should simply ignore background popula-
tions for decision-making purposes, and that we should apply ‘axiological
weights’ to non-human welfare subjects that reduce their contribution to
the size of the background population. Section 9 considers how real-world
background populations affect the importance of avoiding existential catas-
trophe according to average utilitarianism and variable-value views. Section
10 briefly describes three more potential implications of our results: they
make it harder to avoid (a generalization of) the Repugnant Conclusion,
help us to extend non-additive axiologies to infinite-population contexts,
and suggest that agents who accept non-additive axiologies may be vulner-
able to a novel form of manipulation. Section 11 is the conclusion.
2 Formal setup
All of the population axiologies we will consider evaluate worlds based only
on the number of welfare subjects at each welfare level. We will consider
only worlds containing a finite total number of welfare subjects (except in
§10.2, where we consider the significance of our results for infinite ethics).
We will also set aside worlds that contain no welfare subjects, simply because
some theories of population axiology, like average utilitarianism, do not
evaluate such empty worlds.
Thus for our purposes a population is a non-zero, finitely supported
function from the setW of all possible welfare levels to the set Z+ of all non-
negative integers, specifying the number of welfare subjects at each level.
Despite this formalism, we’ll say that a welfare level w occurs in a population
X to mean that X (w ) 6= 0. An axiology A is a strict partial order A on
the setP of all populations, with ‘X A Y ’ meaning that population X is
better than population Y according toA . Almost all the axiologies we will
consider in this paper can be represented by a value function VA :P →R,
meaning that X A Y ⇐⇒ VA (X )>VA (Y ).
To illustrate this formalism, the size |X | of a population X is simply the
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total number of welfare subjects:
|X | := ∑
w∈W
X (w ).
Similarly, the total welfare is
Tot(X ) :=
∑
w∈W
X (w )w .
Of course, the definition of Tot(X ) only makes sense on the assumption
that we can add together welfare levels, and in this connection we generally
assume thatW is given to us as a set of real numbers. With that in mind,
the average welfare
X := Tot(X )/|X |
is also well-defined.
3 Additivity
We can now give a precise definition of additive separability.
If X and Y are populations, then let X + Y be the population obtained
by adding together the number of welfare subjects at each welfare level in
X and Y . That is, for all w ∈W , (X + Y )(w ) = X (w )+ Y (w ). An axiology is
separable if, for any populations X , Y , and Z ,
X +Z  Y +Z ⇐⇒ X  Y .
This means that in comparing X +Z and Y +Z , one can ignore the shared
sub-population Z . Separability is entailed by the following more concrete
condition:
Additivity
An axiologyA is additively separable (or additive for short) iff it can be
represented by a value function of the form
VA (X ) =
∑
w∈W
X (w ) f (w )
with f :W →R. Thus the value of X is given by transforming the welfare
of each welfare subject by the function f and then adding up the results.
In the following discussion, we will sometimes want to focus on the dis-
tinction between additive and non-additive axiologies, and sometimes on
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the distinction between separable and non-separable axiologies. While an
axiology can be separable but non-additive, none of the views we will con-
sider below have this feature. So for our purposes, the additive/non-additive
and separable/non-separable distinctions are more or less extensionally
equivalent.5
We will consider three categories of additive axiologies in this paper,
which we now introduce in order of increasing generality. First, there is
total utilitarianism, which identifies the value of a population with its total
welfare.6
Total Utilitarianism (TU)
VTU(X ) = Tot(X ) =
∑
w∈W
X (w )w = X |X |.
An arguable drawback of TU is that it implies the so-called ‘Repugnant
Conclusion’ (Parfit, 1984), that for any two positive welfare levels w1 <w2,
for any population in which everyone has welfare w2, there is a better pop-
ulation in which everyone has welfare w1. The desire to avoid the Repug-
nant Conclusion is one motivation for the next class of additive axiologies,
critical-level theories.7
Critical-Level Utilitarianism (CL)
VCL(X ) =
∑
w∈W
X (w )(w − c ) = Tot(X )− c |X |= (X − c )|X |
for some constant c ∈ W (representing the ‘critical level’ of welfare
above which adding an individual to the population constitutes an
improvement), generally but not necessarily taken to be positive.
We sometimes write ‘CLc ’ rather than merely ‘CL’ to emphasize the depen-
dence on the critical level. TU is a special case of CL, namely, the case
with critical level c = 0. Note that, as long as c is positive, CL avoids the
Repugnant Conclusion since adding lives with very low positive welfare
makes things worse rather than better.8
5For a detailed discussion of separability principles in population ethics, see Thomas
(forthcoming).
6Total utilitarianism is arguably endorsed (with varying degrees of clarity and explic-
itness) by classical utilitarians like Hutcheson (1738), Bentham (1789), Mill (1863), and
Sidgwick (1874), and has more recently been defended by Hudson (1987), de Lazari-Radek
and Singer (2014), and Gustafsson (forthcoming), among others.
7Critical-level views have been defended by Blackorby et al. (1997, 2005), among others.
8But a positive critical level also brings its own, arguably greater drawbacks—e.g., the
Strong Sadistic Conclusion (Arrhenius, 2000).
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Another arguable drawback of both TU and CL is that they give no
priority to the less well off—that is, they assign the same marginal value to
a given improvement in someone’s welfare, regardless of how well off they
were to begin with. We might intuit, however, that a one-unit improvement
in the welfare of a very badly off individual has greater moral value than the
same welfare improvement for someone who is already very well off. This
intuition is captured by prioritarian theories.9
Prioritarianism (PR)
VPR (X ) =
∑
w∈W
X (w ) f (w )
for some function f :W →R (the ‘priority weighting’ function) that is
concave and strictly increasing.
CL is a special case of PR where f is linear, and TU is a special case where f
is linear and passes through the origin. Note also that our definition of the
prioritarian family of axiologies is very close to our definition of additive
separability, just adding the conditions that f is strictly increasing and
weakly concave.
4 Averagist and asymptotically averagist views
In this section and the next, we consider two categories of non-additive
axiologies and show that, in the presence of large enough background popu-
lations, they converge with some additive axiology. In this section, we show
that average utilitarianism and related views converge with CL, where the
critical level is the average welfare of the background population. In the
next section, we show that various non-additive egalitarian views converge
with PR.
First, though, what do we mean by converging to an additive (or any
other) axiology? The claim makes sense relative to a specified type of back-
ground population, e.g., all those having a certain average level of welfare.
Convergence
AxiologyA converges toA ′ relative to background populations of type
9Versions of prioritarianism have been defended by Weirich (1983), Parfit (1997), Arne-
son (2000), and Adler (2009, 2011), among others. Sufficientarianism, which by our definition
will count as a special case of prioritarianism, has been defended by Frankfurt (1987) and
Crisp (2003), among others.
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T , if and only if, for any populations X and Y , if Z is a sufficiently large
population of type T , then
X +Z A ′ Y +Z =⇒ X +Z A Y +Z .
Of course, ifA ′ is separable, the last implication can be replaced by
X A ′ Y =⇒ X +Z A Y +Z .
We can, in other words, compare X + Z and Y + Z with respect toA by
comparing X and Y with respect toA ′—if we know that Z is a sufficiently
large population of the right type.
Note two ways in which this notion of convergence is fairly weak. First,
what it means for Z to be ‘sufficiently large’ can depend on X and Y . Second,
the displayed implication need not be a biconditional; thus, whenA ′ does
not have a strict preference between X + Z and Y + Z (e.g., when it is
indifferent between them), convergence toA ′ does not imply anything
about howA ranks of those two populations. Because of this, every axiology
converges to the trivial axiology according to which no population is better
than any other. Of course, such a result is uninformative, and we are only
interested in convergence to more discriminating axiologies. Specifically,
we will only ever consider axiologies that satisfy the Pareto principle (which
we discuss in §5.1).
4.1 Average utilitarianism
Average utilitarianism, as the name suggests, identifies the value of a popu-
lation with the average welfare level of that population.10
Average Utilitarianism (AU)
VAU(X ) = X =
∑
w∈W
X (w )
|X | w .
10Average utilitarianism is often discussed but rarely endorsed. It has its defenders,
however, including Hardin (1968), Harsanyi (1977), and Pressman (2015). Mill (1863) can
also be read as an average utilitarian (see fn. 2 in Gustafsson (forthcoming)), though the
textual evidence for this reading is not entirely conclusive.
As with all evaluative or normative theories—but perhaps more so than most—average
utilitarianism confronts a number of choice points that generate a minor combinatorial
explosion of possible variants. Hurka (1982a,b) identifies three such choice points which
generate at least twelve different versions of averagism. The view we have labeled AU (which
Hurka calls A1) strikes us as the most plausible, but our main line of argument could be
applied to many other versions. Versions of averagism that only care about the future
population do present us with a challenge, which we discuss in §7.
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Our first result describes the behavior of AU as the size of the background
population tends to infinity.
Theorem 1. Average utilitarianism converges to CLc , relative to background
populations with average welfare c . In fact, for any populations X , Y , Z , if
Z = c and
|Z |> |X |VCLc (Y )− |Y |VCLc (X )
VCLc (X )−VCLc (Y ) (1)
then VCLc (X )>VCLc (Y ) =⇒ VAU(X +Z )>VAU(Y +Z ).
Proofs of all theorems are given in the appendix. Discussion of this and
other results is deferred to §10.
4.2 ‘Variable value’ views
Some philosophers have sought an intermediate position between total and
average utilitarianism, acknowledging that increasing the size of a popula-
tion (without changing average welfare) can count as an improvement, but
holding that additional lives have diminishing marginal value. The most
widely discussed version of this approach is the variable value view.11 It is
useful to distinguish two types of this view, the second more general than
the first.
Variable Value I (VV1)
VVV1(X ) = X g (|X |), where g : Z+→R+ is increasing, concave, non-zero,
and bounded above.
Variable Value II (VV2)
VVV2(X ) = f (X )g (|X |), where f : R→R is differentiable and strictly in-
creasing, and g : Z+→R+ is increasing, concave, non-zero, and bounded
above.
Sloganistically, variable value views can be ‘totalist for small popula-
tions’ (where g may be nearly linear), but must become ‘averagist for large
populations’ (as g approaches its upper bound). It is therefore not entirely
surprising that, in the large-background-population limit, VV1 and VV2
display the same behavior as AU, converging to a critical-level view with
the critical level given by the average welfare of the background population.
Theorem 2. Variable value views converge to CLc relative to background
populations with average welfare c .
11These views were introduced by Hurka (1983). Variable Value I is also discussed by Ng
(1989) under the name ‘Theory X′’.
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For the broad class of variable value views, we cannot give the sort of
threshold for |Z | that we gave for AU, above which the ranking of X +Z and
Y +Z must agree with the ranking given by CLZ . For instance, because g
can be any function that is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and bounded
above, variable value views can remain in arbitrarily close agreement with
totalism for arbitrarily large populations, so if TU prefers one population to
another, there will always be some variable value theory that agrees. In the
case of VV1, we can say that if both TU and AU prefer X to Y , then all VV1
views will as well (see Proposition 1 in the appendix), and so whenever TU
and CLZ have the same strict preference between X and Y , the threshold
given in Theorem 1 holds for VV1 as well. For VV2, we cannot even say this
much.12
5 Non-additive egalitarian views
A second category of non-additive axiologies are motivated by egalitarian
considerations. Whether adding some individual to a population, or increas-
ing the welfare of an existing individual, will increase or decrease equality
depends on the welfare of other individuals in the population, so it is easy
to see why concern with equality might motivate separability violations.
Egalitarian views have been widely discussed in the context of distribu-
tive justice for fixed populations, but relatively little has been said about
egalitarianism in a variable-population context. We are therefore somewhat
in the dark as to which egalitarian views are most plausible in that context.
But we will consider a few possibilities that seem especially promising, try-
ing to consider each fork of two major choice points for variable-population
egalitarianism.
The most important choice point is between (i) ‘two-factor’/‘pluralistic’
egalitarian views, which treat the value of a population as the sum of two
(or more) terms, one of which is a measure of inequality, and (ii) ‘rank-
discounting’ views, which give less weight to the welfare of individuals who
are better off relative to the rest of the population. These two categories
of views are extensionally equivalent in the fixed-population context, but
come apart in the variable-population context (Kowalczyk, ms).
12What we can say about VV2 is the following: when X > Y , |X | ≥ |Y |, and f (X ) ≥ 0,
VV2 is guaranteed to prefer X to Y . Similarly, when X > Y , |Y | ≥ |X |, and f (Y ) ≤ 0, VV2
is guaranteed to prefer X to Y . (These claims depend only on the fact that f is strictly
increasing and g is increasing.) So in any case where the population preferred by CLZ is
larger and has average welfare to which VV2 assigns a non-negative value, or the population
dispreferred by CLZ is larger and has average welfare to which VV2 assigns a non-positive
value, VV2 will agree with CLZ whenever AU does.
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5.1 Two-factor egalitarianism
Among two-factor egalitarian theories, there is another important choice
point between ‘totalist’ and ‘averagist’ views.
Totalist Two-Factor Egalitarianism
V (X ) = Tot(X )− I (X )|X |, where I is some measure of inequality in X .
Averagist Two-Factor Egalitarianism
V (X ) = X − I (X ), where I is some measure of inequality in X .13
Here, in each case, the second term of the value function can be thought
of as a penalty representing the badness of inequality. Such a penalty could
have any number of forms, but for the purposes of illustration we stipu-
late that I (X ) depends only on the distribution of X , where this can be
understood formally as the function X /|X |:W →R giving the proportion
of the population in X having welfare w . The degree of inequality is indeed
plausibly a matter of the distribution in this sense, and the badness of in-
equality is then plausibly a function of the degree of inequality and the size
of the population. The more substantial assumption is that the badness
of inequality either scales linearly with the size of the population (for the
totalist version of the view) or does not depend on population size (for the
averagist version).
Now, we want to know what these theories do as |Z | →∞. In the last
section, we had to hold one feature of Z constant as |Z | → ∞, namely,
Z . Egalitarian theories, however, are potentially sensitive to the whole
distribution of welfare levels in the population, and so to obtain limit results
it is useful to hold fixed the whole distribution of welfare in the background
population, i.e. D := Z /|Z |. We’ll state the general result, and then give
some examples.
Theorem 3. Suppose V is a value function of the form V (X ) = Tot(X ) −
I (X )|X |, or else V (X ) = X − I (X ), where I is a differentiable function of
the distribution of X . Then the axiologyA represented by V converges to
an additive axiology relative to background populations with any given
distribution D , with weighting function14
f (w ) = lim
t→0+
V (D + t 1w )−V (D )
t
.
13One could also imagine variable-value two-factor theories (and two-factor theories
that incorporate critical levels, priority weighting, etc., into their value functions), but we
will set these possibilities aside for simplicity.
14Here 1w ∈ P is the population with a single welfare subject at level w , and we use
the fact that value functions of the assumed form can be evaluated directly on any finitely
supported, non-zero functionW →R+, such as, in particular, D and D + t 1w .
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If the Pareto principle holds with respect toA , then f is weakly increasing,
and if Pigou-Dalton transfers are weak improvements, then f is weakly
concave.
A few points in the theorem require further explanation. We will explain
the relevant notion of differentiability when it comes to the proof (see Re-
mark 1 in the appendix); as usual, functions that are easy to write down tend
to be differentiable, but it isn’t automatic. The Pareto principle holds that
increasing anyone’s welfare increases the value of the population. This prin-
ciple clearly holds for prioritarian views (because the priority-weighting f
is assumed to be increasing), but it need not in principle hold for egalitarian
views: conceptually, increasing someone’s wellbeing might contribute so
much to inequality as to be on net a bad thing. Still, the Pareto principle is
generally held to be a desideratum for egalitarian views. Finally, a Pigou-
Dalton transfer is a total-preserving transfer of welfare from a better-off
person to a worse-off person that keeps the first person better-off than
the second. The condition that Pigou-Dalton transfers are at least weak
improvements (they do not make things worse) is often understood as a
minimal requirement for egalitarianism.
To illustrate this result, let’s consider two more specific families of egal-
itarian axiologies that instantiate the schemata of totalist and averagist
two-factor egalitarianism respectively.
For the first, we’ll use a measure of inequality based on the mean absolute
difference (MD) of welfare, defined for any population X as follows:
MD(X ) :=
∑
v,w∈W
X (w )X (v )
|X |2 |w − v | .
MD(X ) represents the average welfare inequality between any two individu-
als in X . MD(X )|X | can therefore be understood as measuring total pairwise
inequality in X . Consider, then, the following totalist two-factor view:
Mean Absolute Difference Total Egalitarianism (MDT)
VMDT (X ) = Tot(X )−αMD(X )|X |
where α ∈ (0, 1/2) is a constant that determines the relative importance
of inequality.15
15For α≥ 1/2, equality would be so important that the Pareto principle would fail, i.e.,
it would no longer be true in general that increasing someone’s welfare level increases the
value of the population.
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Second, consider the following averagist two-factor view, which identi-
fies overall value with a quasi-arithmetic mean of welfare:16
Quasi-Arithmetic Average Egalitarianism (QAA)
VQAA(X ) = QAM(X ) = g
−1
∑
w∈W
X (w )
|X | g (w )

.
for some strictly increasing, concave function g :W →R.
Implicitly, the measure of inequality in QAA is I (X ) = X −QAM(X ), which
one can show is a positive function, weakly decreasing under Pigou-Dalton
transfers. In the limiting case where g is linear, QAM(X ) = X . More generally,
QAA is ordinally equivalent to an averagist version of prioritarianism.
Theorem 4. MDT converges to PR, relative to background populations with
a given distribution D . Specifically, MDTα converges to PR f , the prioritarian
axiology whose weighting function is
f (w ) = w −2αMD(w , D ) +αMD(D ).
Here MD(w , D ) :=
∑
x∈W D (x )|x −w | is the average distance between w and
the welfare levels occurring in D .
Theorem 5. QAA converges to PR, relative to background populations with
a given distribution D . Specifically, QAAg converges to PR f , the prioritarian
axiology whose weighting function is
f (w ) = g (w )− g (QAM(D )).
5.2 Rank discounting
Another family of population axiologies that is often taken to reflect egali-
tarian motivations is rank-discounted utilitarianism (RDU). The essential
idea of rank-discounting is to give different weights to marginal changes in
the welfare of different individuals, not based on their absolute welfare level
(as prioritarianism does), but rather based on their welfare rank within the
population.
One potential motivation for RDU over two-factor views is that, because
we are simply applying different positive weights to the marginal welfare of
16See Fleurbaey (2010) and McCarthy (2015, Theorem 1) for axiomatizations of this type
of egalitarianism, at least in fixed-population cases where the totalist/averagist distinction
is irrelevant.
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each individual, we clearly avoid any charge of ‘leveling down’: unlike on
two-factor views, there is nothing even pro tanto good about reducing the
welfare of a better-off individual—it is simply less bad than reducing the
welfare of a worse-off individual.17
Versions of rank-discounted utilitarianism have been discussed and
advocated under various names in both philosophy and economics, e.g. by
Asheim and Zuber (2014) and Buchak (2017). In these contexts, the RDU
value function is generally taken to have the following form:
V (X ) =
|X |∑
k=1
f (k )Xk (2)
where Xk denotes the welfare of the k th worst off welfare subject in X , and
f : N→R is a positive but decreasing function.18
However, these discussions often assume a context of fixed population
size, and there are different ways one might extend the formula when the
size is not fixed. We will consider the most obvious approach, simply taking
equation (2) as a definition regardless of the size of X .19 A view of this type,
explicitly designed for a variable-population context, is set out in Asheim
and Zuber (2014). Simplifying slightly to set aside features irrelevant for our
purposes, their view is as follows:
Geometric Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism (GRD)
VGRD(X ) =
|X |∑
k=1
βk Xk
for some β ∈ (0, 1).
17It is important to remember, however, that two-factor views with an appropriately
chosen I , like those we considered in the last section, can avoid all-things-considered leveling
down: that is, while they may suggest that there is something good about making the best
off worse off, they never claim that it would be an all-things-considered improvement.
18Using the standard notation in this paper, one can alternatively write
V (X ) =
∑
w∈W

g
 ∑
v≤w
X (v ))− g (∑
v<w
X (v )

w
for some increasing, concave function g : R→Rwith g (0) = 0. The two presentations are
equivalent if g (k ) =
∑k
i=1 f (k ) or conversely f (k ) = g (k )− g (k −1).
19An alternative approach would be to extend to variable-populations the ‘veil of ig-
norance’ description of rank-discounting described by Buchak (see also McCarthy et al.
(2020, Example 2.9)). However, on the most obvious way of doing this, the resulting view is
coextensive with a two-factor egalitarian view and so falls under the purview of Theorem 3
(even if it is conceptually different in important ways).
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Here, the rank-weighting function is f (k ) = βk . In general, since f
is assumed to be non-increasing and positive, f (k ) must asymptotically
approach some limit L as k increases. For GRD, L = 0. But a simpler
situation arises when L > 0 (so that f is bounded away from zero), and this
is the case we will consider first, before returning to GRD.
Bounded Rank-Discounted Utilitarianism (BRD)
VBRD(X ) =
|X |∑
k=1
f (k )Xk
for some non-increasing, positive function f : R→R that is eventually
convex20 with asymptote L > 0.
In stating the result, we will need to restrict the foreground populations
under consideration.
Convergence on S
AxiologyA converges toA ′, relative to background populations of type
T , on a set of populations S , if and only if, for any populations X and Y
in S , if Z is a sufficiently large population of type T , then
X +Z A ′ Y +Z =⇒ X +Z A Y +Z .
Having fixed a background distribution D = Z /|Z |, say that a population X
is moderate with respect to D if the the lowest welfare level in X is no lower
than the the lowest welfare level in D . In other words, for any x ∈W with
X (x ) 6= 0, there is some z ∈W with z ≤ x and D (z ) 6= 0. Then we can state
the following result:
Theorem 6. BRD converges to TU relative to background populations with
a given distribution D , on the set of populations that are moderate with
respect to D .
When, as in GRD, the asymptote of the weighting function f is at L = 0,
the situation is subtler and appears to depend on the exact rate at which f
decays. We will consider only GRD, as it is the best-motivated example in
the literature.
In fact, GRD does not converge to an additive, Paretian axiology on
any interesting range of populations. Roughly speaking, this is because,
20That is, there is some k such that f is convex on the interval (k ,∞). The assumption
of eventual convexity is simply a technical assumption to be used in Theorem 6 below.
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as the background population gets larger, the weight given to the best-off
individual in X becomes arbitrarily small relative to the weight given to the
worst-off—smaller than the relative weight given to it by any particular ad-
ditive, Paretian axiology. Nonetheless, it turns out that GRD does converge
to a separable, Paretian axiology. We’ll explain this carefully, but perhaps
the most important take-away of this discussion will be that, given a large
background population, GRD leads to some very strange and counterintu-
itive results. The limiting axiology will be critical level leximin, defined by
the following conditions:
Critical Level Leximin (CLLc )
1. If X and Y have the same size, then X  Y if and only if X 6= Y and
the least k such that Xk 6= Yk is such that Xk  Yk .
2. If X and Y differ only in that Y has additional individuals at welfare
level c , then X and Y are equally good.21
In a sense, CLLc is simply a limiting case of prioritarianism, where the pri-
ority given to the less-well-off is infinite. In particular, although it is not
additively separable in the narrow sense defined in §2, which requires an
assignment of real numbers to each individual, one can check that it is
separable, and indeed one can show that it is additively separable in a more
general sense, if we allow the contributory value of an individual’s welfare
to be represented by a vector rather than a single real number.22
To state the theorem, fix a set W ⊂W of welfare levels. Say that a pop-
ulation X is supported on W if X (w ) = 0 for all w /∈W . And say that W is
covered by a distribution D = Z /|Z | if and only if there is a welfare level in Z
between any two elements of W , a welfare level in Z below every element
of W , and welfare level in Z above every element of W .
Theorem 7. Let W ⊂ W be any set of welfare levels, and D a population
that covers W . GRD converges to CLLc relative to background populations
with distribution D , on the set of populations that are supported on W ; the
critical level c is the highest welfare level occurring in D .
Critical level leximin has a number of extreme and implausible features;
as the theorem suggests, these will often be displayed by GRD when there is
a large background population. For example, tiny benefits to worse-off in-
dividuals will often be preferred over astronomical benefits to even slightly
21To compare X and Y in general, use the second condition to find populations X ′ and
Y ′ that are equally as good as X and Y respectively, but such that |X ′| = |Y ′|, and then
compare them using the first condition.
22See McCarthy et al. (2020, Example 2.7) for details in the constant-population-size
case.
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better-off individuals; moreover, adding an individual to the population
with anything less than the maximum welfare level in the background pop-
ulation will often make things worse overall.23 In fact, according to CLLc , it
makes things worse to add one person slightly below the critical level along
with any number of people above the critical level; because of this, GRD
implies what we might call the ‘Snobbish Conclusion’:
Snobbish Conclusion
Suppose X consists of one person with an arbitrarily good life, at level
w , and any number of people with even better lives. Then there is some
possible background population Z , in which the average welfare is far
worse than w , and in which the very best lives are only slightly better
than w , such that Z + X is worse than Z .
This seems crazy to us. We could just about understand the Snobbish Con-
clusion in the context of an anti-natalist view, according to which adding
lives invariably has negative value; but, according to GRD, there are many
possible background populations Z such that Z + X would be better than
Z . We could also understand the view that adding good lives can make
things worse if it lowers average welfare or increases inequality (e.g. as mea-
sured by mean absolute difference or standard deviation). But, again, that’s
not what’s going on here. Instead, GRD implies that adding excellent lives
makes things worse if the number of even slightly better lives already in
existence happens to be sufficiently great, regardless of the other facts about
the distribution. In the limiting case, it makes things so much worse that it
cannot be compensated by adding any number of even better lives.
6 Real-world background populations
In the rest of the paper, we investigate the implications of the preceding
results, and especially their practical implications for morally significant
real-world choices. As we have seen, how closely a given non-additive axiol-
ogy agrees with its additive counterpart in some real-world choice situation
depends on the size of the population that can be treated as ‘background’
23A toy example illustrates these phenomena, which are somewhat more general than
the theorem entails. Suppose the background population consists of N people at level
100. Let X consist of two people at level 99; let Y consist of one person at level 98 and
one at level 1000; and let Z consists of two people at level 99 and one at 99.9. We have
VGRD(X )−VGRD(Y ) =β −β 2−900βN +2, which is positive if N is large enough, in which case
X GRD Y , illustrating the first claim. On the other hand, VGRD(X )−VGRD(Z ) = 0.1β 3−βN +3,
again positive for N large enough; then X GRD Z , illustrating the second claim.
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in that choice situation. And what that additive counterpart will be (i.e.,
which version of CL or PR) depends on the average welfare of the back-
ground population, and perhaps on its entire welfare distribution. In this
section, therefore, we consider the size and (to a lesser extent) the welfare
of real-world background populations.
We note that nothing in this section (or the next two) shows conclusively
that the background population is large enough for our limit results to be
effective, but we do establish a prima facie case for their relevance. In §9,
we will seek firmer conclusions in a stylized case.
We have so far taken the separation between ‘background’ and ‘fore-
ground’ populations as given, but it will now be helpful to make these
notions more precise. Given a choice between populations X1, X2, ...Xn ,
the population Z that can be treated as background with respect to that
choice is defined by Z (w ) = mini X i (w ). That is, the background population
consists of the minimum number of welfare subjects at each welfare level
who are guaranteed to exist regardless of the agent’s choice. For this Z and
for each X i , there is then a population X
∗
i such that X i = X
∗
i +Z . The choice
between X1, X2, ...Xn can therefore be understood as a choice between the
foreground populations X ∗1 , X ∗2 , . . . , X ∗n , in the presence of background pop-
ulation Z .
Clearly, this means that different real-world choices will involve different
background populations. In particular, more consequential choices (that
have far-reaching effects on the overall population) allow less of the popula-
tion to be treated as background, whereas choices whose effects are tightly
localized (or otherwise limited) may allow nearly the entire population to
be treated as background. But we can also define a ‘shared’ background
population for some set of choice situations, by considering all the over-
all populations that might be brought about by any profile of choices in
those situations. Thus we can speak, for instance, of the population that is
‘background’ with respect to all the choices faced by present-day human
agents, consisting of the minimum number of individuals at each welfare
level that the overall population will contain whatever we all collectively do
(perhaps simply equal to the number of individuals at each welfare level
outside Earth’s present future light cone).24
24Here and below, we assume a causal decision theory, which guarantees that causally
inaccessible populations can be treated as ‘background’. How we can identify background
populations, and how their practical significance changes, in the context of non-causal
decision theories are interesting questions for future research.
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6.1 Population size
Past welfare subjects on Earth constitute the most obvious component of
real-world background populations. Estimates of the number of human
beings who have ever lived are on the order of 1011 (Kaneda and Haub, 2018),
of whom only ∼ 7×109 are alive today. But of course Homo sapiens are not
the only welfare subjects. At any given time in the recent past, for instance,
there are also many billions of mammals, birds, and fish being raised by
humans for meat and other agricultural products. And given their very high
birth/death rates, past members of these populations greatly outnumber
present members.
But since human agriculture is a relatively recent phenomenon, farmed
animals make only a relatively small contribution to the total background
population. Wild animals make a far greater contribution. There are to-
day, conservatively, 1011 mammals living in the wild, along with similar
or greater numbers of birds, reptiles, and amphibians, and a significantly
larger number of fish—conservatively 1013, and possibly far more.25 This
is despite the significant decline in wild animal populations in recent cen-
turies and millennia as a result of human encroachment.26 Inferring the
total number of past mammals, vertebrates, etc from the number alive at a
given time requires us to make assumptions about population birth/death
rates. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find data that allow us to
estimate overall birth/death rates for the wild mammal or wild vertebrate
populations as a whole with any confidence. So we will simply adopt what
strikes us as a very safely conservative assumption of 0.1 births/deaths per
individual per year in wild animal populations (roughly corresponding to
an average individual lifespan of 10 years). The actual rates are almost cer-
tainly much higher (especially for vertebrates), implying larger total past
populations.
Being extremely conservative, then, we might suppose that all and only
mammals are welfare subjects and that 1011 mammals have been alive
on Earth at any given time since the K-Pg boundary event (the extinction
event that killed the dinosaurs, ∼ 66 million years ago), with a population
birth/death rate of 0.1 per individual per year. This gives us a background
population of ∼ 6.6×1017 individuals. Being a bit less conservative (though
perhaps still objectionably conservative), we might suppose that all and
only vertebrates are welfare subjects and that 1013 vertebrates have been
25For useful surveys of evidence on present animal population sizes, see Tomasik (2019)
and Bar-On et al. (2018) (especially pp. 61-4 and Table S1 in the supplementary appendix).
26For instance, Smil (2013, p. 228) estimates that wild mammalian biomass has declined
by 50% in the period 1900–2000 alone.
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alive on Earth at any time in the last 500 million years (since shortly after
the Cambrian explosion), with the same population birth/death rate of 0.1
per individual per year. This gives us a background population of ∼ 5×1020
individuals.27
6.2 Welfare
Anything we say about the distribution of welfare levels in the background
population will of course be enormously speculative. So although the ques-
tion has important implications, we will limit ourselves to a few brief re-
marks.
With respect to average welfare in the background population, two
hypotheses seem particularly plausible.
Hypothesis 1 The background population consists mainly of small ani-
mals (whether terrestrial or extraterrestrial). Most of these animals have
short natural lifespans, so the average welfare level of the background
population is very close to zero. If the capacity for positive/negative
welfare scales with brain size (or related features like cortical neuron
count), this would reinforce the same conclusion. It seems likely that
average welfare in these populations will be negative, at least on a hedo-
nic view of welfare (Ng, 1995; Horta, 2010). These assumptions together
would imply, for instance, that AU, VV1 and VV2 converge to a version of
CL with a slightly negative critical level (perhaps very similar in practice
to TU).
Hypothesis 2 The background population mainly consists of the mem-
bers of advanced alien civilizations. If, for instance, the average bio-
sphere produces 1023 wild animals over its lifetime, but one in a million
biospheres gives rise to an interstellar civilization that produces 1035
individuals on average over its lifetime, then the denizens of these in-
terstellar civilizations would greatly outnumber wild animals in the
27In the name of conservatism, we are setting aside various hypotheses that might
generate much larger background populations. First, of course, even the restriction to
vertebrates excludes potential welfare subjects like crustaceans and insects. Second, we
Earthlings may not be the only welfare subjects. The observable universe contains roughly 2
trillion galaxies (Conselice et al., 2016), and the universe as a whole is likely to be many times
larger (Vardanyan et al., 2011). The universe could therefore contain many other biospheres
like Earth’s. It might also contain advanced, spacefaring civilizations, which could support
enormous populations on the order of 1030 individuals or more (Bostrom, 2003, 2011). So the
extraterrestrial background population could be many—indeed, indefinitely many—orders
of magnitude larger than the populations of past mammals or vertebrates on Earth.
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universe as a whole. Under this hypothesis, given the limits of our
present knowledge, all bets are off: average welfare of the background
population could be very high (Ord, 2020, pp. 235–9), very low (Sotala
and Gloor, 2017), or anything in between.
With respect to the distribution of welfare more generally, we have even
less to say. There is clearly a non-trivial degree of welfare inequality in the
background population—compare, for instance, the lives of a well-cared-for
pet dog and a factory-farmed layer hen. Self-reported welfare levels in the
contemporary human population indicate substantial inequality (see for
instance Helliwell et al. (2019), Ch. 2), and while contemporary humans
need not belong to the background population with respect to present-
day choice situations, it seems safe to infer that there has been substantial
welfare inequality in human populations in at least the recent past. For non-
human animals, of course, we do not even have self-reports to rely on, and
so any claims about the distribution of welfare are still more tentative. But
there is, for instance, some literature on farm animal welfare that suggests
significant inter-species welfare inequalities (e.g. Norwood and Lusk (2011,
pp. 224–9), Browning (2020)).
That said, it could still turn out that the background population is dom-
inated by welfare subjects who lead fairly uniform lives—e.g., by small ani-
mals who almost always experience lifetime welfare slightly below 0, or by
members of alien civilizations that converge reliably on some set of values,
social organization, etc., that produce enormous numbers of individuals
with near-equal welfare.
7 Objection 1: Causal domain restriction
We have shown that various non-additive axiologies converge to additive
axiologies in the large-background-population limit. But proponents of
non-additive views might wish to avoid drawing practical conclusions from
these results. After all, much of the point of being, say, an average utili-
tarian rather than a critical-level utilitarian is to reach the right practical
conclusions in cases where AU seems more plausible than CL. That point is
defeated if, in practice, AU is nearly indistinguishable from CL.
The simplest way to avoid the implications of our limit results is to
claim that, for decision-making purposes, agents should simply ignore
most or all of the background population. This idea can be spelled out
in various ways, but it seems to us that the most principled and plausible
precisification is a causal domain restriction (Bostrom, 2011), according to
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which an agent should evaluate the potential outcomes of her actions by
applying the correct axiology only to those populations that might exist in
her causal future (presumably, her future light cone).28 Since background
populations of the sort described in the last section will mostly lie outside
an agent’s future light cone, a causal domain restriction may drastically
reduce the size of the population that can be treated as background, and
hence the practical significance of our limit results.
Here are three replies to this suggestion. First, to adopt a causal domain
restriction is to abandon a central and deeply appealing feature of conse-
quentialism, namely, the idea that we have reason to make the world a better
place, from an impartial and universal point of view. That some act would
make the world a better place, full stop, is a straightforward and compelling
reason to do it. It is much harder to explain why the fact that an act would
make your future light cone a better place (e.g., by maximizing the average
welfare of its population), while making the world as a whole worse, should
count in its favor.29
Second, the combination of a causal domain restriction with a non-
separable axiology can generate counterintuitive inconsistencies between
agents (and agent-stages) located at different times and places, with re-
sulting inefficiencies. As a simple example, suppose that A and B are both
agents who evaluate their options using causal-domain-restricted average
utilitarianism. At t1, A must choose between a population of one individual
with welfare 0 who will live from t1 to t2 (population X ) or a population of
one individual with welfare −1 who will live from t2 to t3 (population Y ). At
t2, B must choose between a population of three individuals with welfare 5
(population Z ) or a population of one individual with welfare 6 (population
W ), both of which will live from t2 to t3. If A chooses X , then B will choose
W (yielding an average welfare of 6 in B ’s future light cone), but if A chooses
Y , then B will choose Z (since Y +Z yields average welfare 3.5 in B ’s future
light cone, while Y +W yields only 2.5). Since A prefers Y +Z to X +W
28A causal domain restriction might be motivated by the temporal value asymmetry, our
tendency to attach greater affective and evaluative weight to future events than to otherwise
equivalent past events (Prior, 1959; Parfit, 1984, Ch. 8). It is sometimes claimed that this
asymmetry characterizes only our self-regarding (and not our other-regarding) preferences
(see e.g. Parfit, 1984, p. 181; Brink, 2011, pp. 378–9; Greene and Sullivan, 2015, p. 968;
Dougherty, 2015, p. 3), but recent empirical studies appear to contradict this claim (Caruso
et al., 2008; Greene et al., forthcoming). However, though the temporal value asymmetry is
a clear and robust psychological phenomenon, it has proven notoriously difficult to come
up with any normative justification for asymmetric evaluation of past and future events (see
for instance Moller (2002), Hare (2013)).
29This point goes back to Broad (1914); see Carlson (1995) for a detailed discussion of
this area.
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(which yield averages of 3.5 and 3 respectively in A’s future light cone), A will
choose Y . Thus we get Y +Z , even though X +Z would have been better
from both A’s and B ’s perspectives.30 That two agents who accept exactly
the same normative theory and have exactly the same, perfect information
can find themselves in such pointless squabbles is surely an unwelcome
feature of that normative theory, though we leave it to the reader to decide
just how unwelcome.31
Third, a causal domain restriction might not be enough to avoid the
limit behaviors described in §§4–5, if there are large populations inside
our future light cones that are background (at least, to a good approxima-
tion) with respect to most real-world choice situations. For instance, it
seems likely that most choices we face will have little effect on wild animal
populations over the next 100 years. More precisely, our choices might be
identity-affecting with respect to many or most wild animals born in the next
century (in the standard ways in which our choices are generally supposed
to be identity-affecting with respect to most of the future population—see,
e.g., Parfit (1984, Ch. 16)), but will have little if any affect on the number of
individuals at each welfare level in that population. And this alone supplies
quite a large background population—perhaps 1013 mammals and 1016
vertebrates. Indeed, it is plausible that with respect to most choices (even
comparatively major, impactful choices), the vast majority of the present
and near-future human population can be treated as background. For in-
stance, if we are choosing between spending $1 million on anti-malarial
bednets or on efforts to mitigate long-term existential risks to human civ-
ilization, even the ‘short-termist’ (bednet) intervention may have only a
comparatively tiny effect on the number of individuals at each welfare level
in the present- and near-future human population, so that most of that
population can be treated as background.32
30One general lesson of this example is that, when a group of timelike-related agents or
agent-stages accept the same causal-domain-restricted non-separable axiology, an earlier
agent in the group will have an incentive (i.e., will pay some welfare cost) to push axiologically
significant events forward in time, into the future light cones of later agents, so that their
evaluations of their options will more closely agree with hers.
31The argument is essentially due to Rabinowicz (1989); see also the cases of intertem-
poral conflict for future-biased average utilitarianism in Hurka (1982b, pp. 118–9).
Of course, cases like these also create potential time-inconsistencies for individual agents,
as well as conflict between multiple agents. But these inconsistencies might be avoidable
by standard tools of diachronic rationality like ‘resolute choice’.
32For further discussion of, and objections to, causal domain restrictions in the context
of infinite ethics, see Bostrom (2011) and Arntzenius (2014).
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8 Objection 2: Counting some for less than one
Another way one might try to avoid the limit behaviors described in §§4–5 is
to claim that not all welfare subjects make the same contribution to the ‘size’
of a population, as it should be measured for axiological purposes. Roughly
speaking: although we should not deny tout court that fish are welfare sub-
jects, perhaps, when evaluating outcomes, a typical fish should effectively
count as only (say) one tenth of a welfare subject, given its cognitive and
physiological simplicity. If, in a typical choice situation, the background
population is predominantly made up of such simple creatures, then it
might be dramatically smaller (in the relevant sense) than it would first
appear.33
A bit more formally, we can understand this strategy as assigning a real-
valued axiological weight to each individual in a population, and turning
populations from integer-valued to real-valued functions, where X (w ) now
represents not the number of welfare subjects in X with welfare w , but the
sum of the axiological weights of all the welfare subjects in X with welfare w .
Axiological weights might be determined by factors like brain size, neuron
count, lifespan, or by a combination of ‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ factors (e.g.,
lifespan times neuron count). Weighting by lifespan seems particularly
natural if we think that our ultimate objects of moral concern are stages,
rather than complete, temporally extended individuals. Weighting by brain
size or neuron count may seem natural if we believe that, in some sense,
morally significant properties like sentience ‘scale with’ these measures of
size.
Here are three replies to this suggestion: First, of course, one might
lodge straightforward ethical objections to axiological weights. They seem
to contradict the ideals of impartiality and equal consideration that are
often seen as central to ethics in general and axiology in particular (and
for this reason, may be especially hard to reconcile with egalitarian views
in axiology). It’s also hard to imagine a plausible principle that assigns
reduced axiological weight to non-human animals without also assigning
reduced axiological weight to some humans, which many will find ethically
unacceptable.
Second, the most natural measures by which we could assign axiological
weights generate population size adjustments that, though large, still leave
us with background populations significantly larger than the present human
population. For instance, suppose we stick with our conservative assump-
tion that only mammals are welfare subjects, but also weight by cortical
33Thanks to Tomi Francis and Toby Ord, who each separately suggested this objection.
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neuron count. And, very conservatively, let’s take mice as representative
of non-human mammals in general. Humans have roughly 2875 times as
many cortical neurons as mice (Roth and Dicke, 2005, p. 251). Normalizing
our axiological weights so that present-day humans have an average weight
of 1, this would mean that non-human mammals have an average weight
of 3.48×10−4, which would cut our estimate of the size of the mammalian
background population from ∼ 6.6×1018 down to ∼ 2.3×1015. If we also
weight by lifespan, and generously assume that present-day humans have
an average lifespan of 100 years, then the effective mammalian background
population is reduced to ∼ 2.3×1013.34 Thus, even after making a host of
conservative assumptions (only counting mammals as welfare subjects,
taking a conservative estimate of the number of mammals alive at a time,
ignoring times before the K-Pg boundary event, weighting by cortical neu-
ron count and lifespan, and taking mice as a stand-in for all non-human
mammals), we are still left with a background population more than three
orders of magnitude larger than the present human population.
Third and finally, as we have already argued, even if we entirely ignore
non-humans we may still find that background populations are large relative
to foreground population in most present-day choice situations. To begin
with, past humans outnumber present humans by more than an order of
magnitude (as we saw in §6). And it seems plausible that the large majority
even of the present and near-future human population is approximately
background in most choice situations (as we argued at the end of §7). Thus,
even if we both severely deprioritize or ignore non-humans and adopt a
causal domain restriction, we might still find that background populations
are usually large relative to foreground populations.
9 The value of avoiding existential catastrophe
Taking stock: in §§4–5, we showed that various non-additive axiologies con-
verge to additive axiologies in the presence of large enough background pop-
ulations. In §6, we argued that the background populations in real-world
choice situations are very large—at least, multiple orders of magnitude
larger than the affectable portion of the present and near-future population.
And in §§7–8, we resisted two strategies for deflating the size of real-world
background populations.
If we are right about the size of real-world background populations, this
34When we weight by lifespan, we can derive population size simply from the number of
individuals alive at a time multiplied by time, without needing to make any assumptions
about birth or death rates.
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provides a weak prima facie reason to believe that our limit results are prac-
tically significant—i.e., that what is true in the limit will be true in practice,
for the most plausible versions of the various families of non-additive axiolo-
gies we have considered. That is, the absolute and relative size of real-world
background populations weakly suggests that we should expect plausible
non-additive axiologies to agree closely with their additive counterparts
in real-world choice situations. More generally, it suggests that even if we
don’t accept (additive) separability as a fundamental axiological principle,
it may nevertheless be a useful heuristic for real-world decision-making
purposes—i.e., that arguments in practical ethics that rely on separability
assumptions are likely to be truth-preserving in practice.
9.1 Present welfare vs. future population size
But we will focus on a particular issue in practical ethics where we can
say something a bit more concrete and definite. As we suggested in §1,
perhaps the most important practical implication of our results concerns
the importance of existential catastrophes—more specifically, the extent
to which the potentially astronomical scale of the far future makes it as-
tronomically important to avoid existential catastrophe. An ‘existential
catastrophe’, for our purposes, is any near-future event that would drasti-
cally reduce the future population size of human-originating civilization
(e.g., human extinction).35 To keep the discussion manageable, we will
focus on AU and, secondarily, VV1/VV2. This lets us isolate the central rele-
vant feature of insensitivity to scale (or asymptotic insensitivity to scale) in
the absence of background populations, without the essentially orthogo-
nal feature of inequality aversion.36 We will also focus on the case where
the future generations that will exist if we avoid existential catastrophe
have higher average welfare than the background population, so that AU
assigns positive value to avoiding existential catastrophe, at least in the
large-background-population limit. (But much of what we say about the
value of avoiding existential catastrophe on this assumption also applies,
mutatis mutandis, to the disvalue of avoiding existential catastrophe on the
35This is a broader category of events than ‘premature human extinction’—for instance,
an event that prevented humanity from ever settling the stars, while allowing us to survive
for a very long time on Earth, could be an existential catastrophe in our sense. It is also
importantly distinct from the usual concept of ‘existential catastrophe’ in the philosophical
literature, which is roughly ‘any event that would permanently curtail humanity’s long-term
potential for value’ (see for instance Bostrom, 2013, p. 15; Ord, 2020, p. 37).
36For example, while totalist two-factor egalitarianism in not additive, it is relatively
clear that it can give great value to avoiding existential catastrophe, since the value of a
population scales with its size.
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opposite assumption that the potential future population has lower average
welfare than the background population.)
The importance of avoiding existential catastrophe can be measured by
comparing the value of avoiding existential catastrophe with the value of
improving the welfare of the affectable pre-catastrophe population (which,
for simplicity, we will hereafter call ‘the current generation’). We would
like to know how the answer to this question depends on the welfare and
(especially) the size of the background population.
To formalize the question, let C represent the current generation as it
will be if we prioritize its welfare at the expense of allowing an existential
catastrophe. Let C ′ denote the current generation as it will be if we instead
prioritize avoiding an existential catastrophe. Thus C >C ′, but we assume
that |C | = |C ′|. (This is mostly harmless: it just means that we designate
as the members of C ′ the first |C | individuals in the affectable population
in the world where we avoid existential catastrophe.) Let F denote the
future population that will exist only if we avoid existential catastrophe.
And suppose there is a background population Z , which includes past
terrestrial welfare subjects, perhaps distant aliens, and perhaps unaffectable
present/future welfare subjects like wild animals.
In short, we consider a choice between Z +C and Z +C ′+ F . In terms
of this choice, the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe can be
made precise in several different ways. We will consider the following three:
Maximum incurred cost. Holding fixed the average welfare C of the cur-
rent generation in the world where existential catastrophe occurs, what
is the greatest reduction in welfare for the current generation that is
worth accepting to avoid existential catastrophe?
Maximum opportunity cost. Holding fixed the average welfare C ′ of the
current generation in the world where existential catastrophe does not
occur, what is the greatest improvement in the welfare of the current
generation that is worth forgoing to to avoid existential catastrophe?
Value difference ratio. Holding fixed both C and C ′, and thinking of
Z +C ′ as the status quo, what is the ratio between the changes in value
that would result from (i) avoiding existential catastrophe by adding F ,
versus (ii) raising the welfare of the current generation from C ′ to C ?
Broadly, we want to know how the presence of Z affects these measures
of importance. We know they depend, for one thing, on the size of F ; we
want particularly to know how this dependence is mediated by the size of Z .
In the extreme case, as |Z | →∞, we know from our results in §4 thatAU, VV1,
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and VV2 all converge to CLZ . And according to CLZ , the value of adding F to
the population scales with |F |, so that when |F | is astronomically large, the
importance of avoiding existential catastrophe, by any of these measures,
will be astronomically great. We should therefore expect, a bit roughly, that
AU will give great importance to avoiding existential catastrophe when both
|Z | and |F | are large, and more precisely that its measures of importance
will agree with those of CLZ . The task is to say more about how this works
at a qualitative level, and then (in §9.5) to give some indicative numerical
results.
9.2 Measure 1: Maximum incurred cost
First, we hold fixed the welfare of the the current generation in the catastro-
phe world (where F does not exist), and consider the greatest welfare cost
we are willing to impose on the current generation to avoid catastrophe and
thereby add F to the population.
According to the CLZ , the axiology to which AU, VV1, and VV2 converge
in the limit, this is simply the critical-level sum of welfare in F , given by
|F |(F − Z ). That is, when Tot(C )− Tot(C ′) = |F |(F − Z ), CL is indifferent
between Z +C ′+ F and Z +C . According to AU, analogously, the maxi-
mum cost we are willing to impose on the current generation is the cost
at which Z +C ′+ F = Z +C . We solve for it, therefore, by rearranging this
equation into an equation for Tot(C )−Tot(C ′) in terms of Z , C , and F .37
This rearranged equation turns out to be:
Tot(C )−Tot(C ′) = |Z ||F |(F −Z ) + |C ||F |(F −C )|Z +C | . (3)
The key thing to notice about this equation is its surprising implication
that the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe in the ‘maximum
incurred cost’ sense scales linearly with |F |, with or without a background
population. As we will see, this is not the case for the other two measures
of the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe we consider. The
right way to interpret this fact is as follows: if F >C and |F |  |C |, then AU
is willing to impose enormous costs on the current generation to enable
the existence of F , since if F exists, C ′ will be only a very small part of the
resulting population and must have extremely low average welfare to reduce
C ′+ F below C . And on the other hand, if C > F and |F |  |C |, then AU will
require an enormous increase in the welfare of the current generation (i.e.,
37If we instead wanted to focus on the average (per capita) welfare cost imposed on the
current generation, we could just divide both sides of the following equation by |C |.
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that C ′C ) to compensate for the reduction in average welfare created by
F .
Nevertheless, even by this measure, the size of the background popula-
tion makes a difference because it determines the ‘effective critical level’ to
which F is compared—the average welfare level above which adding F to
the population has positive value, and below which it has negative value.
When |C |  |Z |, the right-hand side of (3) is approximately |F |(F −C );38
thus AU agrees closely with CLC rather than CLZ and is only willing to im-
pose any positive cost at all on the current generation to avoid existential
catastrophe when (with some approximation) F >C . But when |Z |  |C |,
the right-hand side of (3) is approximately |F |(F −Z )—i.e., the value given
by CLZ . This shift could either increase or decrease the value of avoiding
existential catastrophe (depending on whether Z is greater than or less than
C ), and could reverse the sign of the value of avoiding existential catastro-
phe if F is between Z and C . Most notably for our purposes, the effective
critical level will be closer to Z than to C if |Z |> |C |, and will be very close
to Z if |Z |  |C | (since |Z ||F |(F −Z ) rather than |F ||C |(F −C ) will dominate
the numerator in (3)). So by this measure, AU closely agrees with its cor-
responding additive limit theory as long as the background population is
substantially larger than the current generation, i.e., |Z |  |C |.
9.3 Measure 2: Maximum opportunity cost
Now let’s ask the converse question: holding fixed the welfare of the current
generation in the world without existential catastrophe (i.e. holding fixed
C ′), how large a welfare gain for the current generation should we be willing
to forgo to avoid existential catastrophe?
Here again, CL gives the answer |F |(F − Z ). To find AU’s answer, we
rearrange Z +C ′+ F = Z +C into an equation for Tot(C ) − Tot(C ′), this
time in terms of Z , F , and C ′. This gives us:
Tot(C )−Tot(C ′) = |Z ||F |(F −Z ) + |C ′||F |(F −C ′)|Z +C ′+ F | . (4)
Now the size of the background population takes on greater significance.
Consider three cases:
Case 1: |F|  |C′|  |Z|. In this case, the right-hand side of (4) is approx-
imately |C ′|(F −C ′), and the value of avoiding existential catastrophe
38Formally, ‘if a  b then x is approximately y ’ means that lima/b→∞ x/y = 1. In this
case, the limit converges uniformly in |F |.
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as measured by maximum opportunity cost is therefore approximately
independent of |F |.39
Case 2: |F|  |Z|  |C′|. In this case, the right-hand side of (4) is approx-
imately |Z |(F −Z ). Thus the value of avoiding existential catastrophe as
measured by maximum opportunity cost is approximately proportional
to |Z |, which may be astronomically large but is also (we are supposing)
much less than |F |. Note also that the effective critical level is now close
to Z rather than C ′ as in Case 1.
Case 3: |Z|  |F|  |C′|. In this case, the right-hand side of (4) is approx-
imately |F |(F −Z ), in agreement with CLZ . Thus the value of avoiding
existential catastrophe as measured by maximum opportunity cost is
approximately proportional to |F |, and will be astronomically large if
|F | is astronomically large and (F −Z ) is non-trivial.
While there are a number of points of interest in this analysis, the quick
takeaway is that the maximum opportunity cost increases without bound
as we increase both |F | and |Z | (while holding all else equal)—a situation
reflected in Cases 2 and 3 but not Case 1. So, qualitatively, arguments from
astronomical scale can go through if we attend to the potentially astronom-
ical scale of both the future population and the background population.
9.4 Measure 3: Value difference ratio
Finally, we treat Z +C ′ as a baseline, and ask whether it is better to avoid
existential catastrophe by adding F or to improve C ′ to C . More precisely,
we consider the ratio of the value of these improvements:
R =
V (Z +C ′+ F )−V (Z +C ′)
V (Z +C )−V (Z +C ′) .
According to CLZ , R is equal to
|F |(F −Z )
|C |(C−C ′) . According to AU, of course, R is
equal to Z +C
′+F −Z +C ′
Z +C−Z +C ′ . But again, we need to do some rearranging to make
clear how this ratio is affected by the sizes of Z , C , and F . Specifically, in
the case of AU, the formula for R rearranges to
1
C −C ′

F
|F ||Z +C |
|C ||Z +C + F | −C ′
|F |
|Z +C + F | −Z
|Z ||F |
|C ||Z +C + F |

. (5)
39Formally, a claim to the effect of ‘if a  b  c then x is approximately y ’ means that
x/y → 1 as a/b and b /c →∞; more precisely, for any ε> 0, there exists n > 0 such that if
both a/b and b /c are bigger than n , then x/y ∈ (1−ε, 1+ε).
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This expression is unattractive, but informative. Again, let’s consider
three cases:
Case 1: |F|  |C|  |Z|. In this case, (5) is approximately F −C ′
C−C ′ , and the
importance of avoiding existential catastrophe by the value difference
ratio measure is therefore approximately independent of |F |.
Case 2: |F|  |Z|  |C|. In this case, (5) is approximately |Z ||C |× F −ZC−C ′ . Thus
the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe by the value differ-
ence ratio measure is approximately proportional to |Z ||C | . And again,
note that when |Z |  |C |, the effective critical level is close to ∼ Z rather
than C ′.
Case 3: |Z|  |F|  |C|. In this case, (5) is approximately |F ||C | × F −ZC−C ′ , in
agreement with CLZ . Thus the importance of avoiding existential catas-
trophe by the value difference ratio measure is now approximately pro-
portional to |F ||C | , and will be astronomically large if
|F |
|C | is astronomically
large and F −Z
C−C ′ is non-trivial.
As with the maximum opportunity cost, the most basic qualitative point
is that the value difference ratio R increases without bound as we increase
both |F | and |Z |. The fact that possible future and actual background popu-
lations are both likely to be extremely large suggests that the value difference
ratio will be greater than 1 (thus favouring extinction-avoidance) for a robust
range of the other parameters.
9.5 Illustration
So far, our analysis has remained qualitative; we’ll now put in some numbers,
with the purpose of illustrating two things: first, the practical point that
even AU will give great weight to avoiding existential catastrophes, for some
reasonable and even conservative estimates of the background population
and other parameters; second, the more theoretical point that AU converges
to CL with high precision, given these same estimates.
For the sizes of the foreground populations, let’s suppose that |C | =
|C ′| = 1010 (a realistic estimate of the size of the present and near-future
human population) and |F | = 1017 (a fairly conservative estimate of the
potential size of the future human population, if we avoid existential catas-
trophe, arrived at by assuming 1010 individuals per century for the next
billion years). For |Z |, we will consider three values: |Z | = 0 (i.e., the ab-
sence of any background population), |Z |= 1013 (a rounding-down of our
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Axiology |Z| MIC MOC VDR
AU |Z |= 0 5×1016 ∼ 1010 ∼ 2
AU |Z |= 1013 ∼ 1.9985×1017 ∼ 2.0008×1013 ∼ 4.0016×103
AU |Z |= 1020 ∼ 2×1017 ∼ 1.998×1017 ∼ 3.996×107
CL — 2×1017 2×1017 4×107
TABLE 1: The importance of avoiding existential catastrophe, as measured by maximum
incurred cost (MIC), maximum opportunity cost (MOC), and value difference ratio (VDR),
according to AU for different background population sizes and CLZ , with F = 2, |F |= 1017,
C = 1.5, C ′ = 1, |C |= |C ′|= 1010, Z = 0, and |Z | as specified in each row.
most conservative estimate of the number of past mammals, weighted by
lifespan and cortical neuron count, from §8), and |Z | = 103 × |F | = 1020
(arrived at by assuming that the universe contains 1000 other advanced
civilizations, of the same scale that our civilization will achieve if we avoid
existential catastrophe).
In terms of average welfare, we have much less to go on. For simplicity
let’s assume that F = 2 (corresponding to very good but generally normal
human lives) and Z = 0 (plausible for the case where Z consists mainly of
wild animals, somewhat less plausible for the case where it consists mainly
of the member of other advanced civilizations). And let’s assume that C ′ = 1
(except when considering maximum incurred cost, where C ′ is a dependent
variable) and C = 1.5 (except when considering maximum opportunity cost,
where C is a dependent variable).
Table 1 gives the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe ac-
cording to AU and CLZ , under these assumptions, for all three measures of
importance and all three background population sizes. In general, we see
that with three- or four-order-of-magnitude differences in the population
sizes of C , F , and Z , the approximations arrived at above are accurate to at
least the third or fourth significant figure. And more specifically, in the case
where |Z |  |F |  |C |, AU agrees with CLZ on all three measures to at least
the fourth significant figure.
9.6 Conclusions
In summary: when the background population is small or non-existent, the
importance of avoiding existential catastrophe according to AU is approxi-
mately proportional to F −C ′ or F −C (depending on which measure we
consider), and approximately independent of population size, and is there-
fore unlikely to be astronomically large. When the background population
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is much larger than the current generation, but still much smaller than the
potential future population, the importance of avoiding existential catastro-
phe according to AU approximately scales with |Z |, and may therefore be
astronomically large, while still falling well short of its importance according
to CLZ . Finally, if the background population is much larger even than the
potential future population (as it would be, for instance, if it includes many
advanced civilizations elsewhere in the universe), AU agrees closely with
CLZ about the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe, treating it
as approximately linear in |F |, by all three of the measures we considered.
The exception to this pattern is the ‘maximum incurred cost’ measure, by
which the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe scales with |F |
regardless of the size of the background population.
In this very specific context, therefore, we can now say how large the
background population needs to be for large-background-population limit-
ing behavior to ‘kick in’: AU closely approximates CLZ in every respect we
have considered only when |Z |  |F | (or at any rate, only when |Z | > |F |).
But it behaves in important ways like CLZ as long as |Z |  |C |—both in
that it is disposed to assign astronomical importance to avoiding existential
catastrophes, and in that the effective critical level that determines whether
that importance is positive or negative is approximately Z . This lends sig-
nificance to our conclusion in §6 that real-world background populations
are much larger than the current generation (i.e., the affectable present
and near-future population), whether or not they are large relative to the
potential future population as a whole. The former fact alone is enough
to have a significant effect on how AU evaluates existential catastrophes in
practice.
Our conclusions about AU also partially generalize to VV1 and VV2. In
the case of VV1: for any two populations X and Y , if X > Y , |X | ≥ |Y |, and
X ≥ 0, then clearly any VV1 axiology will prefer X to Y . For our purposes,
this means that any VV1 axiology, so long as it assigns non-negative value to
the non-catastrophe population Z +C ′+ F (i.e., so long as Z +C ′+ F ≥ 0),
will prefer that population to the catastrophe population C +Z whenever
AU does. Analogously, in the case of VV2 (which, recall, applies an increas-
ing transformation f to the average welfare of a population): for any two
populations X and Y , if X > Y , |X | ≥ |Y |, and f (X ) ≥ 0, then clearly any
VV2 axiology will prefer X to Y . For our purposes, this means that any VV2
axiology, so long as it assigns non-negative value to the non-catastrophe
population Z +C ′+ F (i.e., so long as f (Z +C ′+ F ) ≥ 0), will prefer that
population to the catastrophe population Z +C whenever AU does.
Putting these observations together, any VV axiology, as long as it assigns
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positive value to the non-catastrophe population, will prefer it to the catas-
trophe population whenever AU does. This means, among other things, that
under this condition, the importance of avoiding existential catastrophe as
measured by maximum incurred cost or maximum opportunity cost, will be
at least as great according to VV as according to AU.40 With respect to value
difference ratio, things are a bit more complicated: when Z +C ′+ F ≥ 0
and Z +C ′+ F ≥ Z +C ′, VV1 is guaranteed to assign more importance than
AU to avoiding existential catastrophe by this measure. But we cannot say
anything analogous about VV2 in this case, since the transformation f it
applies to average welfare can be arbitrarily concave or convex.41
A crucial limitation of our discussion, however, is that we have only
considered the objective importance of existential catastrophes, and not the
prospective or decision-theoretic significance of existential risks (i.e., risks
of existential catastrophe). If we assume a straightforward expectational
decision theory according to which average utilitarians, for instance, should
simply maximize expected average welfare, then the astronomical decision-
theoretic significance of existential risk would follow straightforwardly from
the astronomical axiological significance of existential catastrophe in the
‘value difference ratio’ sense (assuming, of course, that we can have non-
negligible effects on the probability of existential catastrophe). We have
sidestepped the question of risk, however, because there are good reasons
to think that non-additive axiologists should be in the market for something
other than this simple expectational theory of decision-making under risk42,
and there is not yet any unproblematic or widely accepted alternative in
40Consider VV2, of which VV1 is a special case (where f (X ) = X ). If f (Z +C ′+ F +C ′) =
f (Z +C ), and is positive, then g (|Z +C ′+ F |) f (Z +C ′+ F )> g (|Z +C |) f (Z +C ), since g is
increasing. Thus, all else being equal, VV2 axiologies will require either a larger value of C or
a smaller value of C ′ to equalize the value of the populations, meaning that the maximum
incurred cost/maximum opportunity cost that it will accept to avoid existential catastrophe
is greater.
This does not necessarily mean that VV will converge with CLZ faster than AU, with respect
to these measures, as the size of the background population increases. After all, g may be
arbitrarily close to linear up to arbitrarily large population sizes, allowing VV to remain in
close agreement with TU rather than CLZ for arbitrarily large populations. But it does mean
that VV will converge with CLZ faster than AU if it is converging from below.
41If Z +C ′+ F and Z +C ′+ F − Z +C ′ are both non-negative, then
g (|Z +C +F |)Z +C ′+F −g (|Z +C |)Z +C ′
g (|Z +C |)Z +C−g (|Z +C |)Z +C ′ ≥ Z +C ′+F −Z +C ′Z +C−Z +C ′ . (Again, this means that VV1 will converge
with CLZ faster than AU, with respect to the value difference ratio measure, if it is converging
from below.) However, since VV2’s f need only be increasing, f (Z +C
′+F )− f (Z +C ′)
f (Z +C )− f (Z +C ′) can differ to
an arbitrarily extreme degree from Z +C
′+F −Z +C ′
Z +C−Z +C ′ (except when Z +C ′+ F = Z +C ).
42See for instance Thomas (2016, ch. 3), McCarthy et al. (2020, Prop. 4.8), Nebel (forth-
coming), Tarsney (unpublished).
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the literature. We therefore leave the question of how AU, VV1, VV2, and
other non-additive axiologies evaluate existential risk in the presence of
large background populations for future research.
10 Other implications
We conclude by briefly surveying three other interesting implications of our
limit results and, more generally, of the influence of background populations
on the preferences of non-separable axiologies.
10.1 Repugnant Addition
The Repugnant Conclusion, recall, is the conclusion (implied by TU among
other axiologies) that for any positive welfare levels l1 < l2 and any number
n , there is a population where everyone has welfare l1 that is better than a
population of n individuals all with welfare l2. One of the motivations for
population axiologies with an ‘averagist’ flavor (like AU, VV1, VV2, and QAA)
is to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. But the results in §§4–5 imply that,
although they avoid the Repugnant Conclusion as stated above, these views
cannot avoid the closely related phenomenon of ‘Repugnant Addition’:
for any positive welfare levels l1 < l2 and any number n , if Y consists of n
individuals all with welfare l2, there is some population X in which everyone
has welfare l1 and some population Z such that X +Z is better than Y +Z .
As per the results in §4, AU/VV1/VV2 support Repugnant Addition with
respect to a large enough background population Z with Z ≤ 0 (and indeed,
when Z < 0, they support the much more repugnant conclusion that, for
any population Y in which everyone has positive welfare, there is a larger
population X in which everyone has negative welfare such that X +Z is
better than Y +Z ).
The difficulty of avoiding Repugnant Addition has been noticed indepen-
dently by Budolfson and Spears (ms), who provide a thorough exploration
of the phenomenon covering a broader range of axiologies than we have
considered here. So rather than saying any more about this implication, we
direct the reader to their results.
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10.2 Infinite ethics
A long-standing and unresolved challenge for axiology is how to extend
axiologies from finite to infinite contexts.43 Most of the extant proposals for
ranking infinite worlds, in both philosophy and economics, aim to extend
total utilitarianism.44 However, these proposals can easily be adapted to
extend other additive axiologies. For instance, a simple extension of total
utilitarianism (suggested in Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004)) simply com-
pares any two populations by summing the differences in welfare between
the two populations for each individual, treating an individual who doesn’t
exist in a population as having welfare 0.45 This axiological criterion can
easily be adapted to a critical-level or prioritarian theory by simply replacing
welfare with some increasing function of welfare.
It is much less clear, however, how to extend non-additive theories to
the infinite context, and there has so far been little if any discussion of
this question. Our limit results, however, suggest a partial answer: when
comparing two infinite populations, at least when these populations differ
only finitely, we are quite literally in (and not merely approaching) the large-
background-population limit. So it is natural to think that a non-additive
axiologyA that has an additive counterpartA ′ should agree exactly with
that additive counterpart in the infinite context. For instance, if we are
average utilitarians and we live in an infinite world, but we can only affect
a finite part of that infinite world, then we should simply compare the
possible outcomes of our choices by the appropriate infinite generalization
of critical-level utilitarianism, where the critical level is the average welfare
level in the background population.
This suggestion is well-defined only if we have a well-defined notion of
relative frequency for infinite worlds—specifically, the relative frequency of
different welfare levels in an infinite population, which lets us make sense
of further notions like a welfare distribution and average welfare. A natural
suggestion here (advocated, for instance, by Knobe et al. (2006)) is to use the
limiting relative frequency in uniformly expanding spatiotemporal regions,
providing that this limit exists and is the same for all starting locations.
There is plenty of debate to be had about this proposal, but this is not
43For surveys of the difficulties of infinite axiology, see for instance Asheim (2010),
Bostrom (2011), and Ch. 1 of Askell (2018).
44See, for instance, Atsumi (1965), Diamond (1965), Von Weizsäcker (1965), Vallentyne
and Kagan (1997), Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004), Bostrom (2011), Arntzenius (2014), Jons-
son and Voorneveld (2018), Wilkinson (forthcoming), and Clark (ms), among many others.
45Formally, X ¼ Y if and only if
∑
pi ∈ X ∪Y wx(pi )−wy(pi ) converges unconditionally
to a value ≥ 0, where for any pi 6∈ X , wx(pi ) = 0 (and likewise for Y ).
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the place for that debate. At any rate, it seems plausible (though far from
indisputable) that there should be some way of making sense of the relative
frequencies of particular welfare levels in an infinite population.
10.3 Opportunities for manipulation
The results in §§4–5 have one other interesting implication: they suggest
a way in which agents who accept non-separable axiologies can be ma-
nipulated. Suppose, for instance, that we in the Milky Way are all average
utilitarians, while the inhabitants of the Andromeda Galaxy are all total util-
itarians. And suppose that, the distance between the galaxies being what
it is, we can communicate with each other but cannot otherwise interact.
Being total utilitarians, the Andromedans would prefer that we act in ways
that maximize total welfare in the Milky Way. To bring that about, they
might create an enormous number of welfare subjects with welfare very
close to zero—for instance, breeding quintillions of very small, short-lived
animals with mostly bland experiences—and send us proof that they have
done so. We in the Milky Way would then make all our choices under the
awareness of a large background population whose average welfare is close
to zero. If they could create for us a large enough background population
with average welfare sufficiently close to zero, the Andromedans could move
us arbitrarily close to de facto total utilitarianism.
It’s not obvious whether such a strategy would be efficient, but it might
be, if creating small, short-lived welfare subjects with bland experiences
(and transmitting the necessary proof of their existence) is sufficiently cheap.
Since the cost of creating a welfare subject with welfare x presumably in-
creases with |x | (and plausibly increases at a super-linear rate), it might well
make sense for the Andromedans to devote some of their resources to this
manipulation strategy rather than spending all their resources directly on
creating welfare subjects with high welfare.
As the preceding results demonstrate, this kind of manipulability is not
unique to average utilitarians, but applies also to agents who accept variable-
value or non-separable egalitarian views.46 Moreover, the potential for
manipulation is not symmetric: since the Andromedans accept a separable
axiology, what they choose to do in their galaxy will not be affected by
46But manipulating egalitarians may be more expensive, if it requires creating beings
with a wide distribution of welfare levels. Likewise, agents who accept a critical-level view
other than TU may find it more expensive to manipulate in this way, since they may need to
create welfare subjects at or near what they regard as the critical level—unless, for instance,
creating welfare subjects with welfare close to zero can reduce the average welfare of a
pre-existing background population toward that critical level.
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their beliefs about what we are doing in ours (except in the ordinary ways,
involving potential causal interactions between our galaxies).
Diverting though these speculations might be, the real-world opportu-
nities for this sort of axiological manipulation may be quite limited. Setting
aside the likelihood of nearby planets or galaxies being monopolized by pro-
ponents of rival axiologies, if there is a large enough pre-existing background
population in the universe as a whole (say, outside the region accessible
either to us or to the Andromedans), then it may be very hard for the An-
dromedans to have any significant impact on the size or welfare distribution
of the background population. This might be welcome news for them: if
the average welfare of the background population is already close to zero,
then they will get what they want from us averagists, without having to work
for it. But if the average welfare in the background population is non-zero,
then we may not behave quite as the Andromedans would most prefer.
This illustrates a general point: the preceding arguments are not nec-
essarily good news for total utilitarians, or for proponents of any other
separable axiology in particular. In the presence of large background popu-
lations, non-separable axiologies can converge with a wide range of sepa-
rable counterparts, which disagree among themselves about how to rank
populations and how to act for the best. So although large background
populations generate some convergence among axiologies on particular
practical conclusions, axiological disputes remain practically significant.
11 Conclusion
We have shown that, in the presence of large enough background popula-
tions, a range of non-additive axiologies asymptotically agree with some
counterpart additive axiology (either critical-level or, more broadly, prior-
itarian). And we have argued that the real-world background population
is large enough to make these limit results practically relevant. The most
notable implication of these arguments is that ‘arguments from astronom-
ical scale’—in particular, for the overwhelming importance of existential
catastrophes—need not depend on an assumption of axiological separabil-
ity.
We have left many questions unanswered that might be valuable topics
of future research: (1) a more careful characterization of the size and welfare
distribution of the real-world background population; (2) the significance
of risk/uncertainty, particularly with respect to these characteristics of the
background population; (3) the behavior of a wider range of non-additive
axiologies (e.g. incomplete, intransitive, or person-affecting) in the large-
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background-population limit; and (4) exploring more generally the question
of how large the background population needs to be for the limit results
to ‘kick in’, for a wider range of axiologies and choice situations than we
considered in §9.
A Results
Recall that W is the set of welfare levels, and P consists of all non-zero,
finitely supported functionsW →Z+. By a type of populations we mean a
set T ⊂W that contains populations of arbitrarily large size: for all n ∈N
there exists X ∈ T with |X | ≥ n .
The following result, while elementary, indicates our general method.
Lemma 1. Suppose given V : P → R and a positive function s : N → R.
Define
V s (X ) := lim|Z |→∞
 
V (X +Z )−V (Z )s (|Z |)
as Z ranges over populations of some type T . If the axiology with value
function V s is separable, then the axiology with value function V converges
to it, relative to background populations of type T .
Proof. Let Z be a background population of type T . Suppose that V s (X +
Z ) > V s (Y + Z ). Given that the corresponding axiology is separable, we
must have V s (X )>V s (Y ). Then, if |Z | is large enough, 
V (X +Z )−V (Z )s (|Z |)>  V (Y +Z )−V (Z )s (|Z |),
whence, rearranging, V (X +Z )>V (Y +Z ).
Theorem 1. Average utilitarianism converges to CLc , relative to background
populations with average welfare c . In fact, for any populations X , Y , Z , if
Z = c and
|Z |> |X |VCLc (Y )− |Y |VCLc (X )
VCLc (X )−VCLc (Y ) (1)
then VCLc (X )>VCLc (Y ) =⇒ VAU(X +Z )>VAU(Y +Z ).
Proof. In this case, a brief calculation shows
VAU(X +Z )−VAU(Z ) = (X −Z )|X ||X |+ |Z | =
VCLc (X )
|X |+ |Z | . (6)
Setting s (n ) = n we find V sAU(X ) = VCLc (X ), in the notation of Lemma 1. That
Lemma then yields the first statement.
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We now verify the more precise second statement directly. Suppose
Z = c , that (1) holds, and that VCLc (X )>VCLc (Y ). We have to show VAU(X +
Z )>VAU(Y +Z ). Using (6), that desired conclusion is equivalent to
VCLc (X )
|X |+ |Z | >
VCLc (Y )
|Y |+ |Z | .
Cross-multiplying, this is equivalent to
VCLc (X )(|Y |+ |Z |)>VCLc (Y )(|X |+ |Z |)
or, rearranging,
|Z |(VCLc (X )−VCLc (Y ))> |X |VCLc (Y )− |Y |VCLc (X ). (7)
Given that VCLc (X )−VCLc (Y ) > 0, the desired conclusion (7) follows from
(1).
Theorem 2. Variable value views converge to CLc relative to background
populations with average welfare c .
Proof. Suppose the variable value view has a value function of the form
V (X ) = f (X )g (|X |). Then
V (X +Z )−V (Z ) = f (X +Z )g (|X |+ |Z |)− f (Z )g (|Z |)
= f (X +Z )
 
g (|X |+ |Z |)− g (|Z |)
+
 
f (X +Z )− f (Z )g (|Z |).
We now apply two lemmas, proved below.
Lemma 2. We have
 
g (|X +Z |)− g (|Z |)|Z | → 0 as |Z | →∞.
Lemma 3. We have
 
f (X +Z )− f (Z )|Z | → f ′(c )VCLc (X ) as |Z | →∞ with
Z = c .
Since f (X +Z ) → f (c ), and g (|Z |) approaches some upper bound L as
|Z | →∞, we find
lim|Z |→∞
 
V (X +Z )−V (Z )|Z |= f ′(c )VCLc (X )L
as Z ranges over populations with Z = c . Let s (n ) = nf ′(c )L . Then we have
found
lim|Z |→∞
 
V (X +Z )−V (Z )s (|Z |) = VCLc (X ).
The result now follows from Lemma 1.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Let z be the result of rounding |Z |/2 up to the nearest
integer. By increasingness and concavity of g , we have47
0≤ g (|X +Z |)− g (|Z |)|X | ≤
g (|Z |)− g (z )
|Z | − z ≤
g (|Z |)− g (z )
|Z |/2 .
Cross-multiplying,
0≤  g (|X +Z |)− g (|Z |)|Z | ≤ 2 g (|Z |)− g (z )|X |.
Since g (|Z |) and g (z ) both tend to a common limit L as |Z | →∞, we find
that the right-hand side tends to 0 in that limit. Therefore the expression in
the middle also tends to 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. First, if X = c then f (X +Z )− f (Z ) = 0 and VCLc (X ) = 0,
so the result is trivial in that case. Otherwise, since X +Z tends toward c as
|Z | →∞, we have (by the definition of the derivative)
f (X +Z )− f (Z )
X +Z −Z → f
′(c ).
We have, from (6),
X +Z −Z = VCLc (X )|X |+ |Z | .
Inserting this into the preceding formula, we find
( f (X +Z )− f (Z ))(|X |+ |Z |)→ f ′(c )VCLc (X ).
Since ( f (X +Z )− f (Z ))|X | → 0, we obtain the desired result.
Proposition 1. For any populations X and Y , if X TU Y and X AU Y ,
then X VV1 Y .
Proof. First, note that VVV1(X ) has the same sign as X . So if X ≥ 0≥ Y , then
it is automatic that VVV1(X ) > VVV1(Y ). (The condition that X TU Y and
X AU Y excludes the case where X = 0 = Y .) Thus it remains to consider
the case when X and Y are both positive or both negative.
First suppose they are positive. If |X | ≥ |Y |, then, since g is increasing
and X > Y , VVV1(X ) = X g (|X |)> Y g (|Y |) = VVV1(Y ), as required. If, instead,|Y |> |X |, then we have
VVV1(X )
VVV1(Y )
=
X g (|X |)
Y g (|Y |) ≥
X |X |
Y |Y | > 1
47The general fact being used about concavity is that, if x > y > z , then g (x )−g (y )x−y ≤ g (y )−g (z )y−z .
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and therefore VVV1(X )>VVV1(Y ). Here, the first inequality uses the concav-
ity of g , and the second the fact that Tot(X )> Tot(Y )> 0.
The case where X and Y are negative is similar, with careful attention
to signs.
Theorem 3. Suppose V is a value function of the form V (X ) = Tot(X ) −
I (X )|X |, or else V (X ) = X − I (X ), where I is a differentiable function of
the distribution of X . Then the axiologyA represented by V converges to
an additive axiology relative to background populations with any given
distribution D , with weighting function48
f (w ) = lim
t→0+
V (D + t 1w )−V (D )
t
.
If the Pareto principle holds with respect toA , then f is weakly increasing,
and if Pigou-Dalton transfers are weak improvements, then f is weakly
concave.
Remark 1. Before proving Theorem 3, we should explain the requirement
that ‘I is a differentiable function of the distribution of X ’. It has two parts.
First, letPR be the set of finitely-supported, non-zero functionsW →R+.
LetD ⊂PR be the subset of distributions, i.e. those functions that sum to 1.
The first part of the requirement is that there is a function I˜ :D →R such
that I (X ) = I˜ (X /|X |). In that sense, I (X ) is just a function of the distribution
of X . Another way to put this is that I can be extended to a function on all of
PR that is scale-invariant, i.e. I (n X ) = I (X ) for all reals n > 0 and all X ∈PR.
The second part of the requirement is that I , so extended, is differentiable,
in the following sense:49 for all P,Q ∈PR, the limit
∂Q I (P ) := lim
t→0+
I (P + t Q )− I (P )
t
exists and is linear as a function of Q . In effect, Q 7→ ∂Q I (P ) is the best linear
approximation of I − I (P ). In practice we only need I to be differentiable at
the background distribution D .
Proof. Let Z range over background populations with the given distribution
D = Z /|Z |. Thus Z is of the form nD for some n > 0 ∈R.
48Here 1w ∈ P is the population with a single welfare subject at level w , and we use
the fact that value functions of the assumed form can be evaluated directly on any finitely
supported, non-zero functionW →R+, such as, in particular, D and D + t 1w .
49This can also be interpreted as a differentiability requirement directly on I˜ : it should
have a linear Gâteaux derivative.
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Define s (n ) = 1, in the case of TU-based egalitarianism, and s (n ) = n
in the case of AU-based egalitarianism. Noting that value functions of the
assumed form can be evaluated not only onP but on the larger setPR (see
Remark 1), we have
V (n X ) = (n/s (n ))V (X ).
We can then see that V s (as defined in Lemma 1) is the directional
derivative of V at D :
V s (X ) = lim|Z |→∞
 
V (Z + X )−V (Z )s (|Z |)
= lim
n→∞
 
V (nD + X )−V (nD )s (n )
= lim
n→∞
V (D + 1n X )−V (D )
1/n
=: ∂X V (D ).
For totalist egalitarianism, we find that
V s (X ) = Tot(X )− ∂X I (D )− I (D )|X |.
Given that I is differentiable as in Remark 1, this function is additive in
X and therefore represents an additive axiologyA ′. More specifically, for
each welfare level w let 1w be a population with one person at level w . We
then have
V s (X ) =
∑
w∈W
X (w ) f (w ) with f (w ) = w − ∂1w I (D )− I (D ).
Similarly, for averagist egalitarianism,
V s (X ) = (X −D )|X | − ∂X I (D )
=
∑
w∈W
X (w ) f (w ) with f (w ) = w − ∂1w I (D )−D .
Now, suppose X + differs from X in that one person is better off, say with
welfare v instead of w . If the Pareto principle holds with respect to A ,
then V (X + + Z ) ≥ V (X + Z ) for all Z ; by convergence, we cannot have
V s (X +) < V s (X ). It follows that f (v ) ≥ f (w ); thus f is weakly increasing.
By the same logic, Pigou-Dalton transfers do not make things worse with
respect toA ′, and it follows that f is weakly concave.
Theorem 4. MDT converges to PR, relative to background populations with
a given distribution D . Specifically, MDTα converges to PR f , the prioritarian
axiology whose weighting function is
f (w ) = w −2αMD(w , D ) +αMD(D ).
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Here MD(w , D ) :=
∑
x∈W D (x )|x −w | is the average distance between w and
the welfare levels occurring in D .
Proof. Define 〈X , Y 〉=∑x ,y ∈W X (x )Y (y )|x−y |. Then MD(Z ) = 〈Z , Z 〉/|Z |2.
It is easy to check that ∂X 〈Z , Z 〉= 2〈X , Z 〉 and therefore
∂X MD(Z ) = 2
〈X , Z 〉
|Z |2 −2
〈Z , Z 〉
|Z |3 |X |.
In particular, MD is differentiable and Theorem 3 applies. Following the
proof of Theorem 3, we know that MDT converges to the additive axiology
A ′ with weighting function
f (w ) = w −α∂1w MD(D )−αMD(D )
= w −2α〈1w , D 〉−αMD(D )
= w −2αMD(w , D ) +αMD(D ).
Theorem 5. QAA converges to PR, relative to background populations with
a given distribution D . Specifically, QAAg converges to PR f , the prioritarian
axiology whose weighting function is
f (w ) = g (w )− g (QAM(D )).
Proof. Theorem 3 applies, with I (X ) = X −QAM(X ). (We omit the proof
that this I is differentiable.) We have, then, convergence to prioritarianism
with a priority weighting function
f (w ) = ∂1w QAM(D ) =
g (w )−∑x∈W D (x )g (x )
g ′(QAM(D )) .
Since the background distribution D is fixed, this differs from the stated
priority weighting function only by a positive scalar (i.e. the denominator).
Theorem 6. BRD converges to TU relative to background populations with
a given distribution D , on the set of populations that are moderate with
respect to D .
Proof. Suppose that the weighting function f has a horizontal asymptote
at L > 0. As in Lemma 1 it suffices to show that lim|Z |→∞V (X +Z )−V (Z ) =
L Tot(X ), as Z ranges over populations with distribution D , and on the
assumption that X is moderate with respect to D .
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Write X≤w =
∑
x≤w X (w ) for the number of people in X with welfare
at most w , and similarly X<w =
∑
x<w X (w ). Separating out contributions
from X and contributions from Z , we have
V (X +Z )−V (Z ) = ∑
w∈W
X (w )∑
i=1
f (Z≤w + X<w + i )w
+
∑
w∈W
Z (w )∑
i=1
 
f (Z<w + X<w + i )− f (Z<w + i )w .
The assumption that X is moderate means that, in those cases where X (w )≥
1, so that the first inner sum is non-trivial, we also have Z≤w →∞. We see
therefore that each summand in the first double-sum tends to Lw . The
first double sum then converges to
∑
w∈W X (w )Lw = L Tot(X ). It remains
to show that the second double sum converges to 0. Call the summand in
that double sum S (w , i ).
Since there are finitely many w for which Z (w )≥ 1 (making the inner
sum non-trivial), it suffices to show that, for each such w , the inner sum
converges to 0. If X<w = 0, then the inner sum is identically zero, so we can
assume X<w ≥ 1. We can also assume that Z<w is large enough that f is
convex in the relevant range; then
0≤ S (w , i )≤   f (Z<w + X<w )− f (Z<w )w .
Moreover, the number of terms, Z (w ), is proportional to Z<w . It remains to
apply the following elementary lemma with n = Z<w and m = X<w .
Lemma 4. If f is an eventually convex function decreasing to a finite limit,
then n ( f (n +m )− f (n ))→ 0 as n→∞.
This is just a small variation on Lemma 2, and we omit the proof.
Theorem 7. Let W ⊂ W be any set of welfare levels, and D a population
that covers W . GRD converges to CLLc relative to background populations
with distribution D , on the set of populations that are supported on W ; the
critical level c is the highest welfare level occurring in D .
Proof. Suppose X and Y are supported on W , and X CLL Y . Let Z be a
population with distribution D , so Z = nD for some n > 0. We have to show
that X +Z GRD Y +Z for all n large enough.
Let X˜ and Y˜ be populations of equal size, obtained from X and Y by
adding people at the critical level c . The assumption that X CLL Y means
that, for the first m such that X˜m 6= Y˜m , we have X˜m > Y˜m . This shows that
Y˜m < c , so that in fact Y˜m = Ym . For brevity define w := Ym .
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Let v be the next welfare level occurring in X + Y above w . If there is
no such welfare level, then define v = c + 1. We can decompose Z (and
similarly for other populations) as Z = Z− +Zw +Z0 +Z+, where Z− only
involves welfare levels in the interval (−∞, w ), Zw involves only w , Z0 only
involves welfare levels in in (w , v ), and Z+ only involves those in [v,∞).
Note that X− = Y− and X0 = Y0 = 0 but (because D covers W and is only
supported up to c ) Z0 6= 0. We have
V (X +Z ) = V (X−+Z−+Zw ) +β |X−+Z−+Zw |V (Xw )
+β |X−+Z−+Zw +Xw |V (Z0)
+β |X−+Z−+Zw +Xw +Z0|V (X++Z+).
A similar expression holds for Y in place of X . Therefore
V (X +Z )−V (Y +Z )
β |X−+Z−+Zw | = V (Xw )−V (Yw ) + (β
|Xw |−β |Yw |)V (Z0) +R
where the remainder R is such that limn→∞R = 0. Now we use the standard
fact that
∑m
i=1β
i = β 1−βm1−β . It follows that V (Xw )−V (Yw ) = β β
|Yw |−β |Xw |
1−β w .
Therefore
V (X +Z )−V (Y +Z )
β |X−+Z−+Zw | = (β
|Xw |−β |Yw |)(V (Z0)− βw1−β ) +R .
Note that β |Xw |−β |Yw | > 0. To conclude that V (X +Z )>V (Y +Z ) for all n
large enough, it suffices to show that
lim
n→∞V (Z0)>
βw
1−β .
In fact, if v ′ is the lowest welfare level greater than w occurring in D , then
v ′ ∈ (w , v ) and limn→∞V (Z0) = βv ′1−β .
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